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Introduction 
Institutional capacity building in the financial sector of 
Uzbekistan has long been discussed. It has been studied in 
depth by a variety of international organizations as well as 
bilateral agencies including the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), etc. A 
large amount of recommendations and detailed manuals 
have already been provided to the Uzbek authorities banks 
for enhancing the quality of their supervision and 
operations. In fact, it appears that they are almost 
completely inundated with so many detailed instructions 
and procedural manuals to digest. 
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Basic diagnosis  
The unprecedented and turbulent developments in the 
economic and financial situation around 1992/1993 
hampered development of financial intermediation at the 
early stage of the economic transition. In brief, there has 
since been little or practically no financial intermediation 
between the economic agents with fund surplus and those 
with fund deficit in Uzbekistan. (See Figure 1.) Domestic 
savings mobilization through the financial sector has been 
too small to be channeled to productive purposes; most 
savings remain dormant in the form of mattress savings in 
hard currencies. Meanwhile, banking skills in credit risk 
assessment for the corporate sector have not been well 
cultivated; as a result, the role of the financial sector as a 
channel of funds for industrial and commercial activities 
has been severely restricted except for the so-called 
directed loans. What is worse, the corporate sector, which 
requires not only financial resources but also 
entrepreneurship, marketing and accounting skills and, 
above all, a liberal business environment, failed to be 
viable in the present, highly regulated business conditions. 
Such fundamental conditions have, in turn, hindered 
development of sound and solid financial services of 
various kinds including the banking sector. Herein lies the 
basic problem with the Uzbek financial sector. 
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 Figure 2: Indirect Finance
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1. The overview of the financial sector 
 
Since independence, Uzbekistan has implemented a 
series of financial reforms, including the legal set-up for 
introduction of the two-tier banking system, bankruptcy, 
and securities markets. Prudential guidelines for the 
banking business have also been introduced since the early 
stage of transition. The banking sector, despite being 
rudimentary and riddled with many problems as described 
in this memorandum, has shown remarkable transformation 
from the conditions that prevailed in the early 1990s, when 
there were virtually no banking services in the market 
economic sense.  
In the meantime, there are signs of emergence of 
various non-bank financial services like insurance, credit 
cards, leasing, etc., but at this stage they still remain largely 
rudimentary. In the recent past, introduction of even 
deposit insurance and rating services have been under 
consideration and partially initiated.  
Trading of securities is limited to government bonds of 
relatively short maturity. Stock exchanges have been 
established and now appear to be playing a major role as a 
primary market of stocks sold in connection with 
privatization of state-owned enterprises. However, they 
play only a limited role as a secondary market. Corporate 
bond issues have been rare (See Annex for further 
comments on the non-bank financial sector).  
 
 
2. Basic problems 
 
As mentioned earlier, confidence in bank deposit is yet 
to be established. The basic issues that have hampered 
development of the financial sector in general and the 
banking sector in particular are broadly classified to two. 
One is the low degree of confidence in the currency and the 
other is the low degree of confidence in the banking system 
as a whole.  
Hyper-inflation in the early 90s severely eroded 
citizen’s confidence in the domestic currency. Although 
inflation has since then greatly abated, it is still at a high 
level as compared with other transitional countries as well 
as with the domestic rate of interest. The currency has 
largely lost significance as a means of savings. Instead, 
hard currencies, especially the U.S. dollar, have assumed 
the role of preferred means of savings. The increase in 
money supply through such a process has undermined 
citizen’s confidence in the currency further. As a result, 
hard currencies, in particular the dollar, have been hiding 
behind a variety of economic transactions, creating a 
situation of “currency substitution”. There has been a sort 
of vicious circle over the years. 
As to the banking sector, the moratorium in the early 
90s left a strongly adverse influence by eroding citizen’s 
confidence in the sector. Coupled with the high rate of 
inflation, savers were heavily penalized. The policy 
measure of indexation, which was initiated in 1996 to 
compensate bank depositors for the loss incurred during the 
era of hyperinflation (by revaluing the balance of savings 
account as of 1992 by four thousand times), is an good 
indication of the government’s efforts to protect the interest 
of depositors and thereby restore confidence in the banking 
sector.  
This indexation policy, however, should be cautiously 
evaluated because there remains substantial room for 
further improvement in deposit services. Even though 
household savings have sharply increased in the recent past, 
the ratios in the total resource base of the Uzbek banking 
system and in the GDP (at more or less 1%) still appear 
very low by international standards. This has obliged the 
banking sector to resort, as funding sources, to Central 
Bank credits, inter-bank borrowings, foreign borrowings, 
Direct Finance 
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 and/or corporate savings forced under the existing non-cash 
transaction regime whereby the corporate sector is 
compelled to use debit/credit account transfer as the only 
means of settling inter-enterprise transactions. 
Additionally there is still a legacy of the Soviet 
banking system, whose major function used to be to act as 
a settlement agency for the national plan. Bank personnel 
were not equipped with the knowledge and technique of 
providing credit to private sector borrowers. The most 
profitable and safest investment is that in government 
securities. There has been little incentive for banks to 
attract savings, one result of which was poor service to 
customers. This picture of low financial depth in the 
banking sector vis-à-vis the whole economy can be seen in 
Table 1.  
Thus, it is not only that financial intermediation has 
not been established but rather, the term “financial dis-
intermediation” might better apply to describe the present 
situation. In other words, contribution of the financial 
sector has been extremely limited, to economic activities in 
general. (See Table 2 for the comparative status of the 
banking sector in Russia and the Central Asian Republics.) 
 
 
3. Further complications 
 
The situation of the banking sector has been further 
complicated by the following factors, some of which were 
briefly touched upon in preceding paragraphs but are 
elaborated on below. 
First, the banking system has been heavily saddled 
with the so-called directed loans. Many directed loans have 
been extended, often accompanied by government 
guarantee, to projects designated as national importance or 
to clear public sector arrears. In addition, not a few 
enterprises are indebted in hard currency denominated 
loans. The domestic liquidity needs of some of these 
enterprises appear to have been often financed by the 
Central Bank’s credits, directly or indirectly through the 
commercial banking system. But the present business 
conditions characterized by sharply depreciating exchange 
rates have adversely affected their viability. This could lead 
to a possibility of increase of non-performing loans in the 
banking sector in the near future and ultimately to fiscal 
burden (for comparative financial indicators of transition 
economies, see Table 3). 
Apart from its impact on the banking sector, such 
quasi-fiscal operations damage the quality of fiscal 
management by incurring potential fiscal deficit and also 
distort financial discipline in general by creating moral 
hazards in both the creditors’ and the debtors’ minds. 
Second, the multiple exchange rates in Uzbekistan 
have given misleading or even disturbing economic and 
financial signals to the market by imposing an implicit tax 
on exports and subsidy on imports. They have also diverted 
various economic activities to the informal economy, 
adding to tax collection problems by pushing them entirely 
outside the tax base, distorting resource allocation, and thus 
significantly obscuring the real economic landscape. These 
practices, together with the surrender requirement of 
foreign exchange earnings, have encouraged the formation 
of unofficial channels of foreign exchange transactions due 
to a serious shortage of foreign exchange in the official 
market. 
From the financial and economic viewpoint, exchange-
rate-related data are not reliable and do not serve as useful 
indicators for market-oriented activities; they only cause 
confusion. The multiple exchange rate practices also 
hamper good perspective and predictability for financial 
transactions. As a result, the national currencies, which 
circulate with high velocity as a means of payment but fail 
to serve as a means of storage of value, are losing even the 
role of the standard of value. In these circumstances, the 
effectiveness of monetary policy is considerably weakened. 
Third, throughout the period of economic transition 
with highly inflationary conditions, the real interest rate is 
believed to have been generally negative. If this was the 
case with Uzbekistan, the situation of so-called financial 
repression might have dominated the Uzbek financial 
environment. In many countries under high inflationary 
pressure, considerably low (real) interest level discouraged 
savings and diminished financial resources available for 
productive activities, resulting in failure of financial inter-
mediation. Although the refinancing rate at the Central 
Bank has recently been raised from 2.0% to 2.5% per 
month and deposit interest rates were raised, the problem of 
financial repression might still be continuing in view of 
obstinately enduring inflationary forces.  
 
 
4. Technical assistance activities 
 
In view of the difficulties Uzbekistan had faced, a 
number of TA projects have been provided for the financial 
sector development. The World Bank, together with the 
International Finance Corporation, has contributed to the 
improvement of the banking management practices 
including corporate governance; capacity enhancement for 
credit analysis, accounting and auditing, etc. on the basis of 
pilot operations for Asaka Bank, UzPromstroiBank, 
ZhilsberBank, UzDaewoo Bank, Andijan Bank, and Ipak 
Yuli Bank. They also assisted the government in devising 
strategic scenarios for the development of the financial 
sector as a whole (such as separation of bad assets from 
large state-owned banks with a view toward eventual 
privatization).  
The ADB, focusing on two specific Uzbek banks 
(Pakhta Bank and Asaka Bank), identified the needs and 
problems and provided a hands-on TA for the purpose of 
institution building for credit appraisal, risk management 
and corporate governance. The ADB has already 
formulated recommendations for the strengthening of the 
Uzbek banking sector. It has also extended a TA for micro-
credit schemes for Uzbekistan. 
The USAID provided TA assistance to the Central 
Bank in an effort to strengthen the latter’s institutional 
capability in enforcement of prudential regulations 
covering on-site and off-site supervision as well as in 
regulatory and accounting reforms. The USAID assistance 
also included preparation of detailed manuals for credit 
management by commercial banks. In the meantime, the 
EBRD has been providing pilot, program-based loans for 
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 development of medium-and-small businesses, coupled 
with institution building and training assistance for the 
commercial banks involved with the loan utilization. Japan 
has provided a variety of TA activities for training 
purposes through various educational institutions. In 
addition, focusing on the Uzbek Banking Association, the 
Technical Assistance Program for Commonwealth of 
Independent States (TACIS) has provided support to the 
commercial banking sector through seminars and training 
courses. 
The above-mentioned TA contributions appear to be 
showing discernible effects on the financial sector as a 
whole. Although much scope remains for further 
improvement, it seems that the financial supervisors as well 
as commercial bank management and staff have become 
increasingly familiar with the basic concepts and principles 
governing such areas as credit policies and its management. 
Some government officials, Central Bank officers and 
financial managers are becoming increasingly aware of the 
need to take a strategic approach to financial sector reform, 
and to the issue of the disposal of non-performing loans 
arising from directed loans and quasi-fiscal operations in 
particular.  
 
 
5. The Prospect 
 
The strategic approach to the solution of the above-
mentioned problems, however, still remains unclear. They 
relate to such issues as: (1) how the accumulated directed 
loans are to be dealt with; (2) how the banks and the 
borrowers are to cope with the likely deterioration of their 
loan quality arising from depreciation of the domestic 
currency; (3) how and where the banks are to reorient their 
operations to remain viable in the face of diminishing 
government intervention; and (4) how the sector is to 
attract foreign direct investment. Some Uzbek leaders are 
increasingly aware of the magnitude of these problems as 
well as the likely consequences they might cause if left 
unresolved. There are signs of momentum emerging among 
them toward a more constructive reform process.  
Most recently, Uzbekistan concluded with the IMF a 
memorandum (the Staff Monitoring Program--SMP) of 
economic policies to be implemented by the government. 
The policy package described in the memorandum covers a 
number of important measures that will have significant 
implications for the development of the Uzbek financial 
sector. The measures will include substantially liberalized 
access to foreign exchange; gradual removal of the cash 
withdrawal restrictions; stricter control of money supply; 
maintenance of positive interest rates in real terms; and 
minimization of the public sector interference in 
commercial bank operations (except for enforcement of the 
prudential regulations). In short, the macro-economic 
distortions, which tended to impede healthy development 
of the financial sector would be eliminated if smoothly 
implemented.  
Although Uzbekistan is still behind some other 
transitional countries in terms of deregulation, 
implementation of various macro-economic reform 
measures contained in the SMP will present a unique 
opportunity for the financial sector to consolidate itself and 
to emerge as an important vehicle to serve the economy. It 
will also prepare the ground for Uzbekistan to become an 
important member of the international financial community 
(See Table 4 for international commitments of transition 
economies). 
Table 1.  Domestic Credit to Private Sector and Broad Money  (in % of GDP) 
1994 1995 1999  1996 1997 1998 2000
Broad money means M3 except for Kyrgyzstan and Russia where M2 has been adopted. (Source: EBRD Transition report (2001))
7.5(14.8)5.9(11.0) na(10.0)na( 8.7)na( 8.3)na( 7.9) na(13.0)Armenia 
na(11.6)na(10.6) na(10.6)na(13.1)na(11.3)na(12.2) na(55.9)Azer 
na(16.5)11.5(15.5) 12.8(16.6)9.4(14.8)7.4(13.4)8.5(13.9) 12.1(16.0)Russia 
11.3( 8.8)10.0( 7.4) 7.7( 8.1)4.8( 8.6)4.0( 8.3)na(20.5) na(81.7)Tajik 
na(11.8)5.0(13.3) 5.3(14.4)3.5(13.6)8.7(14.3)12.5(17.1) na(12.7)Kyrgyz 
na(20.3)na(12.7) 9.5(14.9)7.8(10.2)5.7( 8.1)na(18.8) na(25.6)Turkmen 
10.6(15.3)7.4(13.6) 5.4( 8.6)4.3(10.3)6.3( 9.5)7.1(11.4) 26.6(13.1)Kazakh  
Uzbek na(18.2) na(14.7) na(34.7) na(21.0) na(17.5) na(16.1) na(11.9)
 The data provided by the Uzbek authorities show that as of December 2001 the broad money was 612 billion sum 
(currency, 214 billion sum, demand deposits, 166 billion sum and quasi-money and others, 232 billion sum) and 
that the domestic credit to the non-governmental sector was 1,816 billion sum (368 billion sum in domestic 
currency and 1,449 billion sum in foreign currency). Assuming that the size of GDP in 2001 was approximately 4 
trillion sum, the ratio of broad money to GDP was approximately 15.3% and the ratio of domestic credit to GDP 
is approximately 45.4%; however, statistical consistency cannot be ensured between the above EBRD data and 
Uzbek data. 
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Table 2.  Financial Sector in Central Asia as of 2000 
 Number of banks (of which foreign owned ) Bad loans ( in % of total loans ) Secured transaction  law Securities commission 
Capital 
adequacy ratio
Deposit 
insurance system
Uzbek 34 ( 6) no Restricted  yes 0.0 8%
Kazakh  48 (16) yes  Yes yes 2.1 8%
noTurkmen 13 (na) Restricted Yes na 10%
Kyrgyz 22 ( 6) no Yes Yes 16.4 12%
Tajik 17 ( 4) no Restricted yes 10.8 12%
Russia 1311 (33) no Restricted yes 15.3 8%
Azer 59 ( 5) no Restricted yes Na(99: 37.2) 8%
Armenia 31 (11) no Restricted yes 6.2 12%
(Source: EBRD Transition report (2001)
Table 3:  Financial Indicators 
 1996 1999 2000 
 Share of state-owned 
banks 
Non-
performing loans 
Share of 
state-owned 
banks 
Non-
performing loans
Share of 
state-owned 
banks 
Non-
performing loans 
EBRD 
index of 
reform 
0.0 Uzbek 75.5 0.0 65.8 0.1 77.5 1.7
2.1 Kazakh  28.4 19.9 19.9 5.5 1.9 2.3
na Turkmen 64.1 11.4 96.6 0.5 na 1.0
16.4 Kyrgyz 5.0 26.1 21.4 6.4 na 2.3
Tajik 5.3 2.9 6.9 15.8 6.8 1.0
15.3 
10.8 
Russia Na 13.4 na 25.8 na 1.7
20.2 na 77.6 82.5 37.2 60.4 2.0
 
2.36.2 2.64.32.422.6 Armenia 
Azer 
3.2 
(Source: EBRD Transition report (2001)) 
The “share of state-owned banks” shows the share of majority state-owned banks in total bank sector assets. 
“Non-performing loans” show the ratio of non-performing loans to the total loans. EBRD index of reform shows 
the degree of progress in the banking sector reform, scoring from 1 to 4; Hungary has a 4.0 rating, as compared 
with 3.3 for Poland, 3.3 for Czech Republic, 3.0 for Slovak Republic and 3.3 for Slovenia. 
Table 4:  International Commitments of Transition Economies (2001) 
IMF Article VIII status  WTO membership
------ Uzbekistan 
September 1996--- Ukraine 
------ Turkmenistan 
------ Tajikistan 
June 1996--- Russia 
June 1995July 2001Moldova 
March 1995December 1998Kyrgyzstan 
July 1996--- Kazakhstan 
December 1996June 2000Georgia 
------ Belarus 
------ Azerbaijan 
Armenia --- May 1997
 (Source: EBRD Transition report (2001)) 
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 Appendix 
Non-Bank Financial Sector (NBFI) 
 
  Uzbekistan appears to have been most interested in 
development of the non-bank financial sector (NBFS). This 
appendix attempts to elaborate on this assue in more detail.  
  The non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) are usually 
characterized by the nature of no deposit taking and no 
payment functions. The NBFI sector is also characterized 
by the weak regulatory environments. In contrast, because 
banks are crucial in ensuring that the financial system and 
the economy run smoothly and efficiently, the banking 
sector is strictly regulated by the supervisory agency(ies). 
The difference in regulatory environments, in turn, tends to 
encourage banks to use NBFIs as a tool for “loophole 
mining,” i.e. a tool to get around the prudential regulations 
in the search for profits. However, it is also true that NBFIs 
provide a variety of complementary, auxiliary and 
peripheral financial services and often play an important 
role in financial intermediation. In recent times, financial 
innovation has increasingly intensified competition with 
the banking sector. 
  The regulatory environments differ among countries 
and there is no non-bank financial sector model as such. In 
this connection, it might be advisable for the relevant 
Uzbek agencies to undertake a comparative review of the 
experiences in other transition economies and developed 
countries. While admitting our hasty comments on this 
sector, however, securities and investments, insurance, 
pension management, and trust businesses are regulated 
less rigorously in many cases, because their impacts on the 
economy are regarded as not so direct as the banking sector. 
This is more conspicuous in the case of finance companies, 
leasing companies, and other financial institutions. In some 
cases, NBFIs tend to be abused by banks or parent 
companies as vehicles to evade financial regulations, 
resulting in financial irregularities and disturbances. 
  If the financial intermediation is tenuous and unreliable 
and savings are not channeled to productive economic 
activities by viable economic entities, financial services 
provided by NBFIs will turn out to be unproductive. The 
consolidation of the financial intermediation process, 
however, will help the NBFIs develop in a sound manner.  
The following table (Table:  The banking sector and 
NBFIs) is intended to compare the banking sector vis-à-vis 
the securities business, insurance, pension scheme, trust 
business, and other NBFIs.  
In Uzbekistan, while the securities business 
represented by the activities in the capital markets remains 
considerably sluggish, the insurance sector appears to be 
dominated by state-owned enterprises. Despite 
accumulated TA activities provided by a number of 
international organizations, the pension scheme remains 
underdeveloped, mainly due to inflationary macroeconomic 
conditions and poor mobilization of domestic savings. In 
addition, the leasing companies and other NBFIs appear to 
be fragmented against the backdrop of the fragile business 
climate in the corporate sector and insufficient financial 
depth in the financial sector. Stabilization in macro-
economic conditions and establishment of financial trust in 
the banking sector and financial inter-mediation are most 
likely to contribute to the development of a variety of 
financial services. 
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Table:  The banking sector and NBFIs 
 
 
 
 
 
Money market dealers, Asset management, Investment advisory, Money changers, Rating 
houses, Accounting and legal advice, Custodian services, etc. 
Virtually unregulated 
or 
Others 
Micro-finance, initiated for the purpose of poverty alleviation, has been in the evolutionary 
process of both saving and lending. One crucial element is to provide micro-credit 
(individual or group lending) to the poor with income-generating activities and employment 
Virtually unregulated 
or 
Weakly regulated 
Micro credit 
Loans are made to those consumers who cannot obtain credit from other sources and have to Virtually unregulated or Consumers loan 
A “factor” buys selected accounts receivable from its customer and receives directly 
’
Virtually unregulated or Factoring 
Two basic types of leases (finance and operating) depend on the use of an asset by the lessee, 
not the ownership. The finance-lease lessor, who is not responsible for maintenance and 
Virtually unregulated 
or 
Leasing 
Finance companies raise funds by issuing CPs, bonds or borrowings and make loans to Virtually unregulated Finance company 
Most trusts are managed by banks or other financial institutions. Investment trusts and 
mutual fundsare includedhere Another important institutional investor
Regulated Trust 
A separate regulatory oversight is required to apply standards of reporting and disclosure of 
informationand restrictionson investmentpractices Another important institutional investor
Regulated Pension scheme 
Non-life 
One of the important institutional investors. A separate regulatory agency is responsible for 
overseeing sales practices, solvency margin to cover losses, and investment practices. 
Insurance companies have now faced with the competitive threat from the banking sector. 
Regulated Life Insurance 
A commission is responsible for investor protection and market integrity.  Securities brokers, 
dealers and investmentbanksaremajorplayers in thesecuritiesmarketofbondsandstocks
Regulated Securities 
In addition to licensing and prudential supervision, deposit-taking institutions are monitored 
and also given regular on-site examinations Due attention is also paid to their
Strictly regulated Banking (deposit-taking) 
RemarksRegulatory environmentFunction/sector 
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